PS2237 Essay: “Give us wings to protect freedom”: The Reality of Realism in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Due to formatting issues, there are no in-text citations here, but you can always email me at jadeow@u.nus.edu for the full PDF version. As usual, do not copy wholesale.

Final Grade: A-

Choose any war between sovereign states in the 20th or 21st century. Which IR theory learnt in this course do you think is the most useful in helping us understand the reason(s) for this war? Why do you say so? Substantiate with empirical evidence.

In the city of Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces continue to maintain their defense lines against a rapidly weakening Russian offensive. A report from Reuters noted that “The average number of daily Russian attacks on the front line reported by Ukraine's general staff has declined for four straight weeks since the start of March, to 69 in the past seven days from 124 in the week of March 1-7”. Consequently, member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who had once treaded cautiously around Russia’s threats of nuclear retaliation are now changing their tunes. In March 2022, Poland became the first NATO country to send fighter jets to the Ukrainian military, followed by Slovakia who pledged 13 MiG-29 fighter jets. At long last, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s pleas for the protection of Ukrainian skies have been answered.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been described as a “strategic blunder” in one paper which argued that the decision to strike Ukraine had resulted in far-reaching “regressive” consequences for the state across practically every sector. However, despite the insurmountable losses that Russia has been dealt with since it invaded Ukraine, it remains remarkable that the Russian leadership determined with such conviction that pro-Ukrainian state actors, particularly the member states of NATO, would be intimidated by its perceived military might. Russia acted with impunity based on its belief that NATO countries would put their own national interests first in a hostile international political climate. This essay seeks to establish that while Russian foreign policy and the Russo-Ukrainian war have mostly been explained by realism, the actual situation in Ukraine demands more nuance as “the important dichotomy is not between realism and idealism but between the theory of realism and the empirical knowledge generated by Ukraine studies.” as Alexander Motyl puts it. Instead of classical realism, this essay puts forth that constructivism is a better explanation for the situation in Ukraine as it provides more space for the nuanced understanding of states on every side of the conflict. At the same time, it would examine the specific national interests that Russia was hoping to pursue in its invasion of Ukraine and compare it with the external environment and threats faced by Russia.

At first glance, Russia’s foreign policy regarding Ukraine closely aligns with the key tenets of realism, particularly classical realism, defined by Richard Devetak and Michele Chiaruzzi as “the concept of anarchy and the historical supposition that international relations are unavoidably shaped by power politics and war”. Here, Devetak reasons that in the absence of a world government, the individual states effectively exist in a state of war, and therefore conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian War can happen because “sovereign states do not recognize any other higher authority above themselves”, and “states are responsible for their own self-preservation”. Even though Russia appears to have overestimated the capabilities of their military, it remains the case that the original intention of Russia was to strike Ukraine based on their reading of global powers and the likely strategic moves that each state actor might take in reaction to the invasion of Ukraine. Devetak’s explanation can be seen in the Russian decision to attack based on both the misguided assumption that their military is powerful enough to quickly decimate the Ukrainian leadership, and the accurate wager that pro-Ukrainian state actors are unlikely to join the conflict due to their own national interests, and to preserve their own sovereignty. As Richard Lebow states about Russia in the context of the Ukrainian invasion, “it is elite actors who set escalatory processes in motion, and because they are overconfident, not fearful”. Therefore, it seems that classical realism can indeed explain the reasons for the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Furthermore, realism also posits that states are the primary actors in their pursuit of power and security. Although both modern and classical realism falls under the same umbrella, the key difference between classical realism and modern realism is that modern realism focuses more on the survival of the state, and a sense of fear in the leadership. In the case of Russia, some researchers have argued that it was the provocations of “the West”, broadly defined as countries who are aligned with or affiliated to NATO, that caused Russia to attack Ukraine as a pre-emptive measure. Mearsheimer argues that “the taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.” In a rebuke against the notion that the liberal mindset could possibly hold any water for the Russo-Ukrainian War, Mearsheimer states that elites in the United States and Europe “tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy.” He then explains that this miscalculation on the part of the Western bloc is precisely what caused Russia to make the most natural decision aligned with their national interests, which is to secure Ukraine as a buffer zone before it can succeed in its bid to join NATO. Therefore, Mearsheimer’s paper appears to provide further evidence of modern realism being the most relevant international relations theory in the case of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

However, a growing number of international relations scholars have pointed out the dangers of subscribing to the view that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a reasonable response to provocations by the West, and indeed, the claim that classical realism can explain any part of the Russo-Ukrainian War at all. Alexander Motyl first lays to rest “the astonishingly bold claim that all states at all times always pursue their own national interests and struggle for power.”, and argues that classical realism is in itself an unprovable overgeneralization of the many state actors who exist within the international anarchy. He elaborates on this argument that realism depends on the notion that all states are rational state actors, and movingly argues that:

“Any concession to subjectivity (such as leaders who assess interests based on their historical memory, political culture, or ideology) opens the door to realism's theoretical antithesis - "idealism" - and its theoretical nightmare - "constructivism," which claims that rationalities and interests are "socially constructed" and, hence, fluid, unstable, and anything but objective.”

Motyl’s reasoning takes shape when he elaborates that the situation in Ukraine cannot simply be explained away by realism, but names three key reasons for the invasion: The war as an outcome of “important domestic developments” within both Russia and Ukraine; the “ideology, culture and norms” in each country; and the understanding that state actors do not always behave in a rational manner. Therefore, to ascribe the Russo-Ukrainian War to just classical realism would be to discount the many other reasons which led to Russia’s decision to invade in February 2022. Instead, the Russo-Ukrainian War is best explained by constructivism, of which Devetak et al describes as a philosophy in which “the kinds of goals held by a state or other actors in world politics emerge from the actor’s identity”, where identity could be understood as “the way in which states, state leaders and other actors conceptualize themselves, the roles they play and the purposes they serve in the world.” This better aligns with both the reasons that Motyl has laid out in his paper, as well as the numerous intricacies of identity which exist between Ukraine and Russia.

Where Russian identity is concerned, Motyl focuses on the political identity of Russia as the key to why a democratic Ukraine is seen as a threat to Russia, with the assertion that the Russian leadership believes that all Russian speakers should be united under one nationality, under the protection of the Russian government. He substantiates this with evidence of Russia pursuing an authoritarian regime under the leadership of Vladimir Putin in contrast to Ukraine’s pro-democracy uprisings, and consequently their refusal to recognize that Ukraine is a legitimate sovereign state. Similarly, a paper by Taras Kuzio argues that Russia’s use of the anti-Nazi rhetoric in Ukraine shows their imperial nationalist ideology, where any Ukrainian who does not accept that they are a “Little Russian” but “upholds an ethnic Ukrainian identity” should be persecuted as a Nazi - which effectively brands all Ukrainian nationalists under the same label as Nazis in Germany in World War II.

Cross-referencing between Kuzio and Motyl, it can be seen that Russia hinges on the argument of the Russian identity to a significant extent in justifying their invasion of a sovereign state. Therefore, it is not a stretch to conclude that the Russo-Ukrainian War began because of Russia’s inability to accept the differences between the political and cultural identities of Russia and Ukraine. This departs from the realist perspective in which Russia is acting solely in the interest of power and survival, and instead presents an alternative theory for Russian aggression in Ukraine. Based on primary evidence of atrocities and mass killings in Bucha, Ukraine, there is certainly reason to believe that the Russo-Ukrainian War began with genocidal motives stemming from Soviet-era nationalism and intolerance for Ukrainian culture.

The constructivist theory on Russian identity builds upon the concept of honor in liberalism, and this can be attributed to what Richard Lebow terms the “honor societies”, where honor takes precedence over survival. Lebow elaborates that “honour-based societies experience conflict about who is ‘recognized’ and allowed to compete for standing” which is highly reminiscent of Russia’s argument against Ukraine as an illegitimate state. Moreover, to explore the identity of the state and therefore the emotions that might drive it to war, Lebow’s quantitative data indicated that 68% of all wars fought between 1648 and 2003 had motives of either standing or revenge. In further discredit to realism, “only 19 of 94 wars appear to have been motivated by security all or in part.” Lebow concludes that based on Vladimir Putin’s personality and self-image, as well as the way he sees Ukraine as “culturally and linguistically more akin to Russia”, and “important by virtue of its population, strategic location, and grain and industrial production”, Russia therefore invaded Ukraine on the principles of identity and spirit. Given both quantitative and qualitative evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the reasons behind the Russo-Ukrainian War were constructivist rather than realist in nature.

As a caveat, I considered the possible application of the term omnibalance to Russia, given that Putin is faced with political developments internally as well as external threats. The Russo-Ukrainian War might have served to rally political support within the country, while catering to bureaucrats and Russian elites who hope to gain from the natural resources in Ukraine which may have resulted in a win-win situation for Putin. Indeed, as Lebow hypothesizes, Putin could have wanted to improve his poll ratings and to “boost his standing”, and this can be interpreted through Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton’s observation of a rise in Putin’s presidential approval ratings following the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the slump in ratings thereafter, which could have been a motive for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. That said, like Lebow, I believe that this is merely a bonus for Putin rather than the main motive which would be rebuilding the identity or the psyche of the Russian state, as seen from Putin’s perspective as a state actor.

In conclusion, the Russo-Ukrainian War was a complex and multifaceted conflict with many different factors at play. However, a constructivist approach to understanding this conflict provides a comprehensive and nuanced explanation of the reasons behind it. Through the lens of constructivism, we can see how the social construction of identities, values, and beliefs played a critical role in shaping the actions and behaviors of both Russia and Ukraine. The war was not just about territory or resources, but also about the perception of national identity in Russia and the desire to protect that identity. By examining the role of ideas and norms in the Russo-Ukrainian War, we can gain a deeper understanding of the conflict and its underlying causes. Ultimately, a constructivist framework helps us see the Russo-Ukrainian War not as an inevitable clash of interests, but as a product of the social and political forces that shape international relations.

(2041 words)

Bibliography:

Charap, Samuel, and Timothy J. Colton. Everyone loses: The Ukraine crisis and the ruinous contest for post-Soviet Eurasia. Routledge, 2018.

Dahiya, Nishant, and Rob Schmitz. “Slovakia Joins Fellow NATO Member Poland in Sending Fighter Jets to Ukraine.” NPR, March 17, 2023. https://www.npr.org/2023/03/16/1163895110/poland-will-send-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-the-first-nato-country-to-do-so.

Devetak, Richard, Jim George, and Sarah Percy, eds. An introduction to international relations. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Domena, E. C., and H. Cooper. "Videos show dead bodies and a mass grave in Bucha, Ukraine." Business Insider 4 (2022).

Gioe, David V., and William Styles. "Vladimir Putin’s Russian world turned upside down." Armed Forces & Society (2022): 0095327X221121778.

Harmash, Olena. “Ukraine Hits Russian-Held City Deep behind Front as Talk of Counteroffensive Grows.” Reuters, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-making-no-headway-bakhmut-avdiivka-ukraine-says-2023-03-28/.

Horovitz, Liviu, and Lydia Wachs. "Russia's nuclear threats in the war against Ukraine: consequences for the international order, NATO and Germany." (2022): 7.

Kuzio, Taras. "Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine." Nations and Nationalism 29, no. 1 (2023): 30-38.

Lebow, Richard Ned. "International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War" Analyse & Kritik 44, no. 1 (2022): 111-135. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2021

Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306.

Motyl, Alexander J. “THE SURREALISM OF REALISM: Misreading the War in Ukraine.” World Affairs 177, no. 5 (2015): 75–84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555427.