PS1101e Essay: From Ruble to Rubble
This essay was written in Chicago format, and as such individual footnotes were lost during formatting. However, references can be found at the bottom of the page.
Please do not plagiarize. It's not worth it. Turnitin sees all.
Module notes will be released on Monday 8th August 2022. It's pretty comprehensive, so hopefully it helps you a little.
4. Choose any 20th or 21st century inter-state conflict. This conflict might not necessarily have led to violence or a war. Which theoretical approach to international relations studied in this class do you think best explains this conflict? Explain and substantiate your answer.From Ruble to Rubble
In this essay, I will study the Russo-Ukrainian war as a frame of reference for Russia’s current position in the international community, while shifting the focus to Russia’s inter-state conflict with the states that it has listed as “unfriendly countries”. While most of the violence is happening in Ukraine, another war is being fought in the global economy as countries refrain from conventional warfare to avoid triggering a retaliatory attack from Russia, which has nuclear weapon capabilities. In condemnation of the violence in Ukraine, those states have instead resorted to alternative nonviolent methods such as freezing Russia’s foreign reserves, seizing Russian assets held by oligarchs overseas and encouraging the exit of investors, businesses and the Russian workforce. Hence, for the purpose of this essay, I would define the economic conflict as being between the “unfriendly countries” listed by Russia, and the Russian Federation. In the interest of neutrality, I will also take the liberty of referring to “unfriendly countries” as pro-Ukraine states. Based on the aforementioned international reaction, it appears that the prevalent theoretical approach to international relations (IR) as demonstrated by states affiliated with the conflict is liberalism. Liberalism is defined by D’Anieri as having “a range of goals beyond accruing power”, where cooperation between states for the collective good is prioritized over anarchic insecurity and the pursuit of power. Resultantly, liberalism imposes constraints on the actor through the structure of the international community and law, while realism does not take these structures into account.
That said, the actual definition of liberalism is a long disputed one. Duncan Bell describes liberalism as being “construed in manifold and contradictory ways”, and reasons that the “ineliminable core” of liberalism is ultimately its focus on ideology over material gain, contextualized according to the perspective of the political actor. In the case of the Russo-Ukrainian war, liberalism is presented in both the outcry at the breach of the global status quo and principles of sovereignty, as well as in the Russian use of the term “denazification” to appeal to its supporters and citizens. Each side of the conflict presents a moral justification for their stance in the war, which reflects the definition of liberalism by Bell. On the other hand, realism is defined by D’Anieri as an exclusively power-centric approach that focuses on amassing power in its various forms. While one might accuse Russia of realist goals due to their clear desire for expansion as exemplified by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, with the definition of liberalism as expounded upon by D’Anieri and Bell, I propose that liberalism best explains the outrage which pro-Ukraine states have displayed to Russia in the aftermath of the invasion.
Liberalism explains the moral outrage to the breach of international principles from the attack on Ukrainian sovereignty. While the term itself does not support any one side of the conflict, liberalism draws on the tendency of pro-Ukraine states to favor democratic governments and respect for international law, which enables cooperation and diplomacy between states, and thus explains the stance of those pro-Ukraine states. As a result, the attack on a sovereign state such as Ukraine invited outrage from many countries whose ideologies and principles are governed by the steadfast commitment to international law and nonviolent international relations. For example, the official Singaporean position on the Russo-Ukraine war is staunchly pro-Ukrainian, where Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan’s parliamentary speech evinced a strong slant towards liberalism:
“When situations arise, our assessments and our actions are based on clearly enunciated and consistently held principles, that are in our own long term national interests. Instead of choosing sides, we uphold principles… Consequently, when we conduct our foreign policy in a coherent and consistent manner, we also become reliable partners for those who operate on the same principles.”
The rhetoric presented above aligns with the definition of liberalism as Singapore based its decision to support Ukraine on its values and principles. In the same speech above, Balakrishnan also invoked Singapore’s position as a small state and asserted that Russia’s rationale for invading Ukraine “would go against the internationally recognised legitimacy and the territorial integrity of many countries, including Singapore”. Taken together, the overall position of the Singapore government is founded on liberalism, where the provided rationale for Singapore’s pro-Ukraine stance is dependent on the national ideology of lawful conduct based on legitimacy and recognized sovereignty. Apart from Singapore, condemnations from other pro-Ukraine states such as the collective statement from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries also focuses on ideological perspectives and highlights Russian aggression as “a fundamental challenge to the values and norms that have brought security and prosperity to all on the European continent”. The statement has similar liberal undertones and once again draws on principles and ideology for international relations with Russia. Hence, I would argue that liberalism is the best explanation for the moral outrage of pro-Ukraine states.
Furthermore, liberalism also explains the reluctance of pro-Ukraine states in escalating the war by sending ground troops. Instead, governments and non-state actors such as multinational corporations and world organizations have focused on heavy-handed economic sanctions which have destabilized Russia’s economy. According to Andrew Moravscik, liberalism may manifest as “structural constraints on the behavior of the state by shaping the underlying preferences on which its foreign policy is based”. Therefore, pro-Ukraine states who act based on the conflicting goal of upholding territorial sovereignty and an understanding of global interdependence are unlikely to risk an escalation of violence by declaring conventional war on Russia without sufficient cause, in order to minimize damage to the international community. Nevertheless, the aforementioned structural constraints have led to pro-Ukraine states using alternatives to war such as imposing harsh sanctions and encouraging the mass exodus of multinational corporations and other players in the private sector. While such moves do not directly impact the war on the ground, they maintain the spirit of supporting the war effort against Russia by sending a strong signal of disapproval through cutting economic ties. Hence, although pro-Ukraine states appear to be faced with the paradox of conflicting liberal goals at first, they have mostly settled on waging an economic war against Russia so as to fulfil part of each liberal goal, so as to stay true to the spirit of political action guided by the principles of liberalism.
On the other side of the conflict, Russia’s offensive is mainly founded on realism. Even though the Russian government claims that it started the war in order to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, their claims have been proven to be strategically engineered with disinformation over the years by political science researchers Juris Pupcenoks and Graig Klein, who have conducted extensive research with a database of over 22,200 English-language articles from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2004 to 2020, and identified that Russia has been using strategic narratives to shape public opinion on Ukraine since 2008. Through the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, the Russian narrative of Ukraine being a troubled and defenceless region which needs saving has been proliferating for over 14 years. Therefore, although Russia’s international relations policy appears to be liberalism at first glance due to its touted focus on “de-Nazification”, there is reason to believe that the facade of liberalism is really a masquerade for realist goals. Close scrutiny of the Russian Kremlin’s foreign policy would reveal that Russian IR have often been conducted with the goal of amassing power and influence, which constitutes strategic and often offensive realism. Consequently, while Russia may have attempted to cover its tracks through popular ideology and strategic narratives, the Kremlin’s actions have shown the realist nature of their foreign policy, governed by a desire to establish a larger sphere of influence in Europe. Therefore, one may conclude that given the historical Russian approach as well as available data on disinformation campaigns on Ukraine, Russia’s international relations are best explained by realism. Nevertheless, the concerted effort by Russia to present a liberal foreign policy should also be recognized as a sign that the Kremlin recognizes the need to conform to the rules of liberalism.
In summary, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a highly complex issue which may not be easily explained by any one international relations theory. While approaches to international relations appear to vary depending on which side of the conflict one is on, the best-fit explanation is still liberalism as it encompasses sentiments of the pro-Ukraine states as well as the Russian Kremlin’s performative rationale for the war. Ultimately, the belligerent actors who have instigated violence in Ukraine will not be forgotten by the international community, and as long as the pro-Ukraine states are prepared to follow the same principles which have led them to condemn the Russo-Ukrainian war, one may reasonably expect the Russian war criminals of Bucha and Mariupol - as well as those on top of the chain of command in the Kremlin - to be tried in international court in due time.
(1622 words)
Bibliography
Bell, Duncan. “What Is Liberalism?” Political Theory 42, no. 6 (June 26, 2014): 682–715. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591714535103.
D'Anieri, Paul J. “Theories of International Relations: Realism and Liberalism.” Essay. In International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs, 5th ed., 55–87. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2017.
de Oliveira Dias, Murillo, Leonardo José Dias Pereira, and Patrícia dos Santos Vieira. “Are the Russian Banks Threatened with Removal from SWIFT? A Multiple Case Study on Interbank Financial Messaging Systems.” International Journal of Scientific Research and Management (IJSRM) 10, no. 3 (March 2022): 1–8. https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsrm/v10i3.em1.
Feinstein, Scott G., and Ellen B. Pirro. “Testing the World Order: Strategic Realism in Russian Foreign Affairs.” International Politics 58, no. 6 (February 22, 2021): 817–34. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5.
Fisher, Scott. “Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Articles from May 2004 - Dec 2020,” June 28, 2021. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/U8CUI7.
Grant, Thomas D. “Annexation of Crimea.” American Journal of International Law 109, no. 1 (2015): 68–95. https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.109.1.0068.
Ivanova, Irina. “Here's How Western Sanctions Are Pummeling Russia's Economy.” CBS News, April 5, 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-economy-2022-impact-of-western-sanctions/.
“Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Ukraine and Its Implications.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, February 28, 2022. Government of Singapore. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/02/20220228-Ministerial-Statement.
Moravscik, Andrew. Liberalism and International Relations Theory. Princeton Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1992. https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf.
Parry, Matthew, and Ionel Zamfir. “Russia's War on Ukraine: International Reactions.” Think Tank | European Parliament. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), March 9, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2022)729298.
Perle, Richard. “Mutually Assured Destruction as a Strategic Policy.” American Journal of International Law 67, no. 5 (1973): 39–40. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000264555.
Pupcenoks, Juris, and Eric James Seltzer. “Russian Strategic Narratives on R2P in the ‘Near Abroad.’” Nationalities Papers 9, no. 4 (August 25, 2020): 757–75. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.54.
Pupcenoks, Juris, and Graig Klein. “Using Lies and Disinformation, Putin and His Team Have Been Building the Case for a Ukraine Invasion for 14 Years.” The Conversation. April 5, 2022. https://theconversation.com/using-lies-and-disinformation-putin-and-his-team-have-been-building-the-case-for-a-ukraine-invasion-for-14-years-179335.
“Russian Government Approves List of Unfriendly Countries and Territories.” TASS, March 7, 2022. https://tass.com/politics/1418197.
Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey. “Over 600 Companies Have Withdrawn from Russia—but Some Remain.” Yale School of Management. Chief Executive Leadership Institute, April 6, 2022. https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-600-companies-have-withdrawn-russia-some-remain.
“Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 24, 2022. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.
Comments
Post a Comment